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1 Introduction
Downside risk of financial assets plays an important role and gives rise to concern
for investors and risk managers. For example, in the banking industry the popularity of
regulating the downside risk, measured by Value-at-Risk (VaR), has emerged through the
regulatory accords such as Basel II and III. The unfolding of the recent financial crisis
further raises the necessity of assessing the risks of potential extreme losses. From a risk
management viewpoint, this calls for a comprehensive understanding of tail risk amongst
regulators. From a corporate finance viewpoint, by managing tail risk, firms can attract
long-term investors that are risk averse; thus, enhancing their access to capital markets.
This paper analyzes downside tail risk in stock returns across firms. First, we test the
tail shape equivalence hypothesis. That is, we test whether the tail shapes in the down-
side tail distribution are cross-sectionally homogeneous. Second, we provide empirical
evidence that when homogeneity of the tail shape holds across stock returns, the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in downside tail risk is determined by differences in the scale.
Lastly, we analyze potential firm-level determinants of downside tail risk.
In classic asset pricing theory, stock returns are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribu-
tion. Recent empirical literature shows that when modeling the distribution of financial
asset returns, particularly that of equity returns, the Gaussian distribution underesti-
mates the probability of extreme losses. Instead, there is large consensus that the tail
distribution of asset returns is heavy-tailed, see, e.g., Mandelbrot (1963) and Jansen and
De Vries (1991). Heavy-tails refer to the fact that the tail region of the distribution
function exhibits a power law decay, as opposed to the exponential decay of the Gaus-
sian distribution. Mathematically, denote the return of a financial asset by R, with the
distribution function F (x) = Pr(R ≤ x). The distribution function F is heavy-tailed if
its left tail can be approximated by a power law as
F (−x) = Pr(R ≤ −x) ∼ Ax−α, as x→∞, (1.1)
where α is the tail shape parameter, commonly referred to as the tail index, and A indi-
2
cates the scale of the distribution. In contrast to the Gaussian distribution, heterogeneity
in the downside tail risk of a heavy-tailed distribution is manifest via differences in the
tail shape and scale of the distribution. Note that in the Gaussian setup, tail risk is
driven entirely by the variance.
The VaR measures the magnitude of an extreme event at a given tail probability
within a fixed time period. Define, V aR(p) as the VaR of R with tail probability p as
Pr(R > V aR(p)) = p. In the heavy-tailed framework, V aR(p) is jointly determined by
the tail index and scale as follows,
V aR(p) ≈
(
A
p
) 1
α
. (1.2)
Under the safety-first preference, Moore et al. (2012) show that if investors are suffi-
ciently risk averse, that is, they guard amply enough against large, low probability high
losses, the tail indices among different stock returns in a common market must be equiv-
alent. This is called the tail index equivalence hypothesis. The intuition behind the tail
index equivalence is as follows. For an extremely low probability level p, the asset with
the lower tail index will always have a higher VaR. In addition, the VaRs corresponding to
different tail indices are diverse when the probability level p tends to zero. Consequently,
the differences in VaRs cannot be compensated by heterogeneity in expected returns.
Therefore, if the admissible probability level of failure of investors is sufficiently low, tail
index equivalence must hold. If tail index equivalence holds, the expected return in the
safety-first pricing model of Arzac and Bawa (1977) can compensate for heterogeneity in
the scale parameter.
Prior theoretical literature typically assumed the tail index equivalence hypothesis
without justification, see, e.g. Hyung and de Vries (2005), Hyung and de Vries (2007),
Ibragimov and Walden (2008) and Zhou (2010). For the most part, robust empirical test-
ing of tail index equivalence has been lacking in the literature. Weak empirical evidence
of tail index equivalence can be found in Jansen and De Vries (1991). However, their
test bears two immediate drawbacks. First, they test the null hypothesis that the tail
indices of two assets, α1 and α2, are jointly equal to a hypothetical value α, whereas in
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application the null hypothesis to be tested is usually H0 : α1 = α2. Second, they impose
a maintained assumption that stock returns are cross-sectionally independent. This is
not plausible when conducting the test for stocks traded in same market. A decade later,
Jondeau and Rockinger (2003), using likelihood ratio tests, provide empirical evidence
of tail index equivalence for stock returns in a common geographical location using data
from 20 countries. Although, their tests allow for dependence across time, they as well
do not take into account the possible cross-sectional dependence across stock returns. On
the contrary, the cross-sectional dependence across stock returns is a consequence of well
known asset pricing models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Arbi-
trage Pricing Model (APT). The dependence in these models stems from common factors
such as the market factor. Therefore, we construct testing procedures to accommodate
this dependence feature.
We allow for tail dependence across stock returns by imposing a multivariate Extreme
Value Theory (EVT) setup and construct two empirical tests: the Minmax and Bench-
mark statistical tests. To show the power of our testing procedures, we run extensive
simulations. Then we apply both tests to a collection of 230 US non-financial firms from
January 2000 to the end of 2011. We do not reject the tail index equivalence hypothesis
from 2008 to 2011. In the periods where tail index equivalence holds, we apply a similar
set of empirical tests to test for tail risk equivalence. This is equivalent to a joint test of
tail index and scale homogeneity. Both tests reject tail risk equivalence over this period.
This result provides weak evidence of tail scale heterogeneity.
To further detect tail scale heterogeneity, we analyze whether the tail scales are differ-
entiated across firms with different firm-level characteristics. If heterogeneity in tail risk
tail scale is solely due to estimation error, then we should not find any relation between
the tail scale and firm-level characteristics. Through a series of cross-sectional regres-
sions, we find that the book-to-market ratio, bid-ask spread and market beta are positive
and significantly related to the scale parameter, while size and leverage are negative and
significantly related to the scale. Hence, heterogeneity in the scale parameter is explained
by firm-level characteristics. We thus confirm that the tail scale is cross-sectionally het-
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erogeneous. In addition, we also highlight the potential drivers of downside tail risk.
These findings are comparable to the literature on the firm-level drivers of cross-
sectional expected stock returns. The general intuition is that investors are compensated
for higher risk taking with a premium in the expected returns . For our selection of
the potential cross-sectional drivers of tail risk we refer to the following literature: Banz
(1981), Fama and French (1992), Bhandari (1988), Basu (1977), Datar et al. (1998) and
Amihud and Mendelson (1986).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we establish statistical
methods to test tail index equivalence under cross-sectional dependency. A simulation
study shows the performance of our testing procedure. We apply these two tests to 230
equities traded in US market in Section 3. In Section 4, we establish statistical methods
on testing tail risk equivalence. In Section 5, we further analyze the drivers of tail risk
at the firm level for those periods in which we fail to reject the tail index equivalence
hypothesis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Statistical Tests: Tail Index Equivalence
2.1 The setup of the tests
We construct two statistical tests to determine whether the tail indices of different
stock return series are equivalent under cross-sectional dependence. A first attempt on
testing such a hypothesis has been conducted under a bivariate setup in Jansen and de
Vries (1991) by assuming independence across stock returns. We begin by reviewing their
procedure.
First, the tail indices of loss returns of stocks are estimated by the so-called Hill
estimator as follows. Denote the return series of two stocks as Ri,t, i = 1, 2 and t =
1, 2, · · · , n. Denote the loss return as Xi,t = −Ri,t. By ranking all {Xi,t}nt=1 as Xi,(n) ≥
Xi,(n−1) ≥ · · · ≥ Xi,(1), the tail index αi for stock return i is estimated by
1
αˆi
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
logXi,(n−j+1) − logXi,(n−k),
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where k := k(n) is an intermediate sequence such that k →∞ and k/n→ 0 as n→∞.
This estimator is proposed in Hill (1975). Mason (1982) proves the consistency of the Hill
estimator under mild conditions. The asymptotic normality of the estimator had been
studies in various authors, see e.g. Hall (1982), Davis and Resnick (1984), Haeusler and
Teugels (1985). They find that
√
k
(
αˆi
αi
− 1
)
d→ N(0, 1),
where N(0, 1) refers to a standard normally distributed random variable. Later ? shows
that the Hill estimator retains its properties for stationary data.
Next, in Jansen and de Vries (1991) test the null hypothesis H0 : α1 = α2 = α for
some given α. By assuming that the two stock return series are independent, the two
estimators αˆ1 and αˆ2 are independent. Hence, under the null that α1 = α2 = α,
k1
(
αˆ1
α
− 1
)2
+ k2
(
αˆ2
α
− 1
)2
d→ χ2(2),
where ki refers to the number of high order statistics used in estimation for αi, and χ
2(2)
refers to a random variable following the χ2 distribution with degree of freedom 2.
The Jansen and de Vries test bears two immediate drawbacks. First, a hypothetical
value of α in the null hypothesis has to be specified ex ante, whereas in an application
a more suitable null hypothesis to be tested is H0 : α1 = α2. Second, the maintained
assumption that stock returns are independent is not plausible when conducting the test
for stocks traded in same market over the same time period. The first drawback can be
overcome by considering alternative testing statistics, while the second drawback calls for
modeling the dependence structure.
We employ multivariate EVT to model the dependence structure across stock returns.
Suppose (X1,t, X2,t), t = 1, 2, · · · , n are observations from a bivariate distribution, indi-
cated by random vector (X1, X2). The EVT model in a bivariate setup is as follows. For
6
any (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]/{(0, 0)},
lim
p→0
1
p
Pr(X1 > V aR1(px1), X2 > V aR2(px2)) = R(x1, x2),
where V aRi(p) refers to the VaR of Xi with tail probability p and R(x1, x2) is a positive
function defined on [0, 1]× [0, 1]/{(0, 0)}. Such a model only imposes an assumption on
the tail dependence between X1 and X2 without restricting the dependence at moderate
level. This is sufficient for our purpose. We remark that all existing asset pricing models
such as CAPM or other factor models satisfy such a dependence assumption provided
that the pricing factors are heavy-tailed.
The following Proposition provides the joint limit distribution of the two Hill estimates
αˆ1 and αˆ2, which is the theoretical foundation for constructing a valid test. The proof is
postponed to the appendix.
Proposition 2.1 Under a proper second order condition and choice of k sequence such
that as n→∞,
√
k
(
αˆi
αi
− 1
)
d→ N(0, 1),
we have that,
√
k
 αˆ1α1 − 1
αˆ2
α2
− 1
 d→ N

 0
0
 ,
 1 R(1, 1)
R(1, 1) 1

 .
Here R(1, 1) is a usual tail dependence measure lying between 0 and 1, sometimes de-
noted by τ in literature (see De Jonghe (2010)). Multivariate EVT provides a consistent
estimator for the correlation coefficient τ = R(1, 1) as follows.
τˆ =
1
k
n∑
t=1
1
X1,t>X1,(n−k) and X2,t>X2,(n−k) .
With the estimated covariance matrix, it is possible to simulate the joint limit distribution
of the two Hill estimators.
Since we tend to compare the tail indices among a group of stocks, we extend the above
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result to a broader context as follows. Denote the loss return for stock i and the market
as Xi,t = −Ri,t, i = 1, 2, · · · , d and XM,t = −RM,t, respectively, where t = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Denote their tail indices as α1, · · · , αd, αM , with corresponding Hill estimators indicated
by αˆ1, · · · , αˆd, αˆM . Similar to the bivariate case, one can prove that with proper second
order condition and choice of the k sequence, as n→∞,
√
k
(
αˆ1
α1
− 1, · · · , αˆd
αd
− 1, αˆM
αM
− 1
)T
d→ N(0T ,Σ),
where 0 is a (d + 1) × 1 vector with zero component, and Σ = (τi,j)(d+1)×(d+1) with τi,j
indicating the R(1, 1) measure between stock i and j, i, j = 1, · · · , d,M .
We first construct a test for the null hypothesis H0 : α1 = α2 = · · · = αd. Consider
the following test statistic
T1 =
max1≤i≤d αˆi −min1≤i≤d αˆi
α¯
, where α¯ =
1
d
d∑
i=1
αˆi.
Under the null hypothesis that α1 = · · · = αd, from the joint limit distribution of the Hill
estimates, it follows that as n→∞, √kT1 converges a limit distribution as maxdi=1Ni −
mindi=1Ni, where (N1, · · · , Nd)T follows a d−dimensional normal distribution with mean
zero and covariance matrix Σ1, which is a submatrix of Σ consisting of the first d rows
and d columns.
Given the estimates of each bivariate τi,j, we can simulate the random vector (N1, · · · , Nd)T
and consequently obtain the simulated limit distribution of
√
kT1. The null hypothesis
is rejected when a high value of T1 is observed. More specifically, if
√
kT1 is above a
certain threshold determined from the simulated limit distribution. For details on a fast
simulation procedure for the limit distribution, see Appendix 7.2. Since the test is based
on comparing the minimum and the maximum of the estimated tail indices, we call this
the Minmax Tail Shape test.
Next, we construct a test on the null hypothesis H0 : α1 = α2 = · · · = αd = αM .
This, of course, can be accomplished via the Minmax Tail Shape test by regarding the
market return as the (d + 1)−th stock. Nevertheless, we can treat the market return as
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a specific benchmark and construct a different test. Consider the following test statistic
T2 =
d∑
i=1
(
αˆi
αˆM
− 1
)2
.
Similar to the discussion for the first test, under the null hypothesis that α1 = · · · = αd =
αM , from the joint limit distribution of the Hill estimators, it follows that as n → ∞,
√
kT2 converges to a limit distribution as
d∑
i=1
(Ni−NM)2, where (N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T follows
a d−dimensional normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ. Similarly,
we reject the null if
√
kT2 is above a certain threshold determined from the simulated
limit distribution. Since this test compares the estimated tail indices of the stocks to
that of the benchmark, we call it the Benchmark Tail Shape test.
2.2 Simulations
Before applying the statistical tests to real data, we run a series of simulations to
verify the performance of the testing procedures. We simulate data from two different
samples and present the test results regarding each sample.
We use the Student-t distribution in all simulations1. We simulate data with a built-in
dependence structure in two different ways:
Sample 1. In the first sample, we simulate random vectors (Y1,t, ..., Yd,t) with common
marginal tail index and differentiated scales.
1. Generate (d+ 1)n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
{Xi,t}, i = 1, . . . , d + 1, t = 1, . . . , n. Each Xi,t follows the standard Student-t
distribution with degrees of freedom α.
2. We use {Xd+1,t}, t = 1, ..., n as a common factor to generate a dependence structure
as follows:
Yi,t =
 λXd+1,t + (1− λ)Xi,t, i = 1, . . . , d/2, t = 1, . . . , n,λXd+1,t + (1− λ) ∗ 2Xi,t, i = d/2 + 1, . . . , d, t = 1, . . . , n,
1The Student-t distribution falls into the class of heavy-tailed distributions. Furthermore, the tail
index associated with a given Student-t distribution is equal to its corresponding degree of freedom.
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where λ ∈ [0, 1] determines the degree of dependence across the observations2.
Then, all {Y1,t, ..., Yd,t} share the same tail index α and are dependent for λ > 0. Note
that their scales are cross-sectionally different. For instance, the ratio of the scale of Y1,t
to that of Yd/2+1,t is
λα+(1−λ)α
λα+[2(1−λ)]α .
Sample 2. In the second sample, we simulate random vectors (Z1,t, ..., Zd,t) with
differentiated tail indices.
1. Generate dn
2
i.i.d. random variables {Xi,t}, i = 1, ..., d/2, t = 1, ..., n. Each Xi,t
follows the standard Student-t distribution with a degree of freedom α1.
2. Generate (d
2
+1)n i.i.d. random variables {Xi,t}, i = d/2+1, . . . , d+1, t = 1, . . . , n.
Each Xi,t follows the standard Student-t distribution with a degree of freedom α2.
3. We again use {Xd+1,t}, t = 1, ..., n as a common factor to generate a dependence
structure as follows.
Zi,t = λXd+1,t + (1− λ)Xi,t, i = 1, . . . , d, t = 1, . . . , n,
where λ ∈ [0, 1].
When α1 > α2 and λ > 0, {Z1,t, ..., Zd,t} have the same tail index α2, but different scales3.
When α1 < α2, {Z1,t, ..., Zd,t} have different tail indices. The tail index of {Zj,t} is α1 for
j = 1, . . . , d/2 and α2 for j = d/2 + 1, . . . , d.
Both samples are generated with dimension d = 100 and number of observations
n = 1000. Then we apply the Minmax Tail Shape and Benchmark Tail Shape tests
outlined in Subsection 2.1 to the simulated observations. In the case of the Benchmark
Tail Shape test, the variable X101,t is taken as the “benchmark” with tail index αM .
For each simulated data set, we run 11 different simulations with different degrees of
dependence, e.g. λ = 0, 0.05, . . . , 0.45, 0.5.
2A non-zero value of λ creates tail dependence between two vectors of observations (Yi,t, Yj,t). The
tail dependence measure, τ , is an increasing function of λ, for any given α. When λ = 0 we have τ = 0.
3Zhou (2010) shows that in a linear combination of two heavy-tailed random variables, the heavier-
tailed random variable (the lower tail index) determines the first-order tail index of the linear combina-
tion.
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For each fixed value of λ, we generate 1000 simulations. In each simulation, we
calculate a test statistic and corresponding p-value, pvalj, j = 1, ..., 1000. The p-value
is determined by comparing the test statistic with the simulated limit distribution from
Appendix 7.2. Then, we calculate the percentage of simulations in which the p-value falls
below the 5% level in each of the two tests by
φ =
(
1
1000
1000∑
j=1
1pvalj≤0.05
)
· 100%.
An acceptable test should produce φ = 5% if the null hypothesis is valid. If the null
hypothesis is not valid, a high value of φ shows a high power of the test.
Table 1 reports the percentage of simulations in which the p-value falls below the 5%
level. We first use two values of the tail index, α = 3 and 4, to generate data as in Sample
1. For this sample, the null hypothesis holds. We observe that both tests are valid as
the φ values are around 5%. Nevertheless, with a moderate tail dependence, i.e. a high
value of λ, both of the Minmax Tail Shape and Benchmark Tail Shape tests reject the
null hypothesis in less than 5% of the simulations. This indicates that both tests do not
tend to have a high probability of type I error. For low λ, i.e. low tail dependence, the
Minmax Tail Shape test performs better, because the Benchmark Tail Shape test rejects
in more than 5% of the simulations.
Then, we generate data as in Sample 2 using the following pairings: {α1, α2} =
{3, 4}, {4, 3}. For the pair {α1, α2} = {3, 4}, the null hypothesis does not hold. In the
simulation, both tests show some power in rejecting the false null hypothesis, though not
at a high level. As the dependence level increases, i.e. λ increases, the power declines,
especially in the case of the Benchmark Tail Shape test. This can be explained by the fact
that if all simulated data load heavily on the common factor, the theoretical differences
in the tail indices, stemming from the idiosyncratic factor, is diminished. For the pair
{α1, α2} = {4, 3}, the null hypothesis on tail index equivalence holds. In this case, the
Benchmark Tail Shape test performs well by reporting a percentage of rejection close to
5%. On the other hand, the Minmax Tail Shape test tends to over reject the true null
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hypothesis. This problem is particularly severe for a low λ value. This is due to the fact
that a low loading on the common factor is not sufficient for generating data that reflect
the theoretical equivalence of the tail indices.
An important factor contributing to the apparent low power in rejecting a false hy-
pothesis is the small difference between α1 and α2 above. To enlarge the difference, we
also generate data from Sample 2 with {α1, α2} = {3, 5} and {5, 3}. The general feature
of the performance of the two tests remains, but the performance is improved. For the
case that {α1, α2} = {3, 5}, the rejection power increases considerably for both tests. For
the case that {α1, α2} = {5, 3}, at least for the Benchmark Tail Shape test, the precision
of the type I error is improves as the numbers get closer to 5%.
In summary, as in the case for most statistical tests, a local alternative destroys the
power of a test. But when the tail index differences increase, the power property improves.
From an economic point of view, the low power in the case that the tail indices are close
is much less of a concern. In such a case, the properties of the two equity returns will be
also similar as to make an arbitrage unprofitable.
3 Testing the tail index equivalence
3.1 Data and Methodology
In this section we apply the statistical tests described in Section 2 to test for tail index
equivalence among equities traded on a common market. We use daily equity return data
of non-financial US companies listed on both the NYSE and the NASDAQ from 2000
to 2011. We split our sample into 9 overlapping periods with 4 years of data in each
period (i.e. 2000-2003, 2001-2004, . . . , 2008-2011). We select stocks that are traded with
sufficient regularity as follows. Each stock selected must have non-zero returns on at least
80% of the trading days in each period, and were traded throughout the entire 11 year
period. In this way, each stock, in each period, has a sufficient number of observations for
the tail index estimation. Furthermore, the selected firms must have available firm-level
accounting data as described in Subsection 5.2. This selection procedure results in 230
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stocks. For the case of the Benchmark test, we use the returns from the S&P 500 index
as the market return4.
For each of the 9 periods we estimate both the tail index and the scale parameter for
each selected stock and the S&P 500 index. The summary statistics of the two parameters
for each period can be found in the first five columns of Table 2 and Table 3. We observe
that there is a huge dispersion in the scale parameter for each period. However, the
inter-period tail index estimates are roughly between 2 and 4. Notice that the dispersion
in the tail index estimates shrinks for the period of 2005-2008. Furthermore, columns 6,
7 of Table 2 report the τˆ tail dependence estimates. The estimate is the average of the
estimated τ value across all pairs, whereas τˆM is the average of the estimated τ between
equities and the market return. These results indicates that we cannot ignore the cross-
sectional dependence when testing the tail index equivalence hypothesis across equities.
Moreover, we observe that the tail dependence is initially low, but increases starting in the
2005-2008 period. From our simulation results in the previous subsection, our statistical
tests can be applied to such a data set with a moderate level of tail dependence.
A technical issue that arises in the estimation procedure regards the choice of the
intermediate sequence, k, for the Hill estimator. The theoretical conditions on k are not
relevant for a finite sample analysis. Instead of taking an arbitrary k, a usual procedure
is to calculate the tail index for different k values and draw a line plot of the estimates
against the k values. With a low k value, the estimator exhibits a large variance, while
for a high k value, since the estimation uses too many observations from the moderate
level, it exhibits a bias. Therefore, k is chosen by picking the first stable part of the line
plot starting from low k, which balances the trade-off between the variance and the bias.
The estimates then follow from such a choice of k. Because k is chosen from a stable
part of the line plot, a small variation of the k value does not change the estimated value.
Thus, the estimates are not sensitive to the exact k value. Following such a procedure,
we keep the percentage of (tail) observations used in the estimation constant at a level
4The return series for the 230 stocks and the market return from the S&P 500 index are collected
from the CRSP data source from January 2000 to December 2011.
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of 3.5% for each sample, i.e. k/n = 3.5%5.
From these estimates we apply the statistical testing procedures from Section 2.1 to
test whether the tail indices are jointly equivalent in the cross-section, i.e.
H10 : α1 = · · · = αd(= αM).
3.2 Results
The results of both tests for each period are reported in the last two columns of Table
2. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of tail index equivalence for the first 4 periods
(i.e. 2000-2003, . . . , 2003-2006). However, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 95%
confidence level for the last 3 periods (i.e. 2006-2009, . . . , 2008-2011). For the periods
2004-2007 and 2005-2008, the Minmax Tail Shape test rejects the null hypothesis while
the Benchmark Tail Shape test fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence
level. Note that the p value of the Minmax Tail Shape test in the period 2005-2008 is
close to 5%. From these results, we conclude that the tail indices are cross-sectionally
heterogeneous for the period starting from 2000 and ending in 2004. On the contrary,
the tail indices are cross-sectionally equivalent for the period from 2008 to the end of
2011. The overlapping nature of the tests makes it difficult however to determine when
the actual break date occurs.
To detect the break, we take a more granular approach by testing the tail index
equivalence hypothesis using a one-month rolling window. In doing so, we are able to
examine more precisely when tail index equivalence holds and when it fails. Figure 1
shows the results of the one month rolling window analysis over the entire sample period.
The plots indicate the p-values of the two tests. From the Benchmark Tail Shape test,
we see that we do not reject tail index equivalence for all dates after September 2008 at
the 95% confidence level. The Minmax Tail Shape test provides a similar pattern.
The analysis is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Moore et al. (2012) that
tail index equivalence should hold when investors have a strong downside risk concern,
5Plots are available upon request.
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e.g. they hold a sufficiently low admissible probability of failure. The initiation of the
financial crisis increased investor awareness of downside risk. Before the crisis a poten-
tial high admissible probability level permitted heterogeneity in the tail indices among
stocks traded in a common market. Investor passiveness towards downside risk preceding
the crisis, coupled with models that underestimated the probability of extreme down-
side returns (e.g. Gaussian distribution assumption), potentially created an environment
where the downside risk of stocks were mis-priced in the market. On the contrary, after
the financial crisis hit, investors became increasingly aware of the downside risk inherent
in their portfolios and began to hold a lower admissible probability of failure to guard
against it. This leads to the homogeneity in the tail indices.
When the tail index equivalence hypothesis holds, the downside tail risk of equity
returns are characterized by the scale parameter of the tail distribution. In the remainder
of the paper we focus on the periods where tail index equivalence is not rejected and
analyze cross-sectional downside tail risk heterogeneity via the scale parameter.
4 Statistical Tests: Tail Risk Equivalence
When the tail index equivalence hypothesis holds, the theoretical model in Moore
et al. (2012) describes how downside risk can be priced by safety-first investors. More
specifically, investors are compensated with higher expected return for holding assets with
higher downside risk, e.g. assets with a larger scale parameter. Given the heterogeneity
in expected returns, heterogeneity in the scale parameters should be allowed. In this
section, we provide evidence on scale heterogeneity by testing for tail scale equivalence
for the periods where tail index equivalence. This is equivalent to testing for tail risk
equivalence.
4.1 The setup of the tests
We construct statistical test on whether the tail indices and scales of different stock
return series are jointly equivalent. The null hypothesis is that H0 : α1 = α2 = · · · =
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αd and A1 = A2 = · · · = Ad.
We recall the notion that the loss return are Xi,t = −Ri,t, i = 1, ..., d and t = 1, ..., n.
Under the null hypothesis, from (1.2), we get that V aR1(p)
V aR2(p)
→ 1 as p → 0. This is the
theoretical relation we aim to test. An estimator for V aRi(p) at the p =
k
n
level is the
(k+1)-th high order statistic Xi,(n−k). Due to the cross-sectional dependence across stock
returns, the order statistics are also dependent.
We continue with the setup on the dependence issue as in Subsection 3.1. The fol-
lowing Proposition provides the joint limit distribution of the d+ 1 order statistics.
Proposition 4.1 With proper choice of k sequence such that as n→∞,
√
k
(
Xi,(n−k)
V aRi(k/n)
− 1
)
d→ N
(
0,
1
α2i
)
,
for all i = 1, ..., d,M , we have that,
√
k
(
X1,(n−k)
V aR1(k/n)
− 1, · · · , Xd,(n−k)
V aRd(k/n)
− 1, XM,(n−k)
V aRM(k/n)
− 1
)T
d→ N(0T ,BΣB),
where 0 is a (d + 1) × 1 vector with zero component, B = diag {1/α1, · · · , 1/αd, 1/αM}
and Σ = (τi,j)(d+1)×(d+1) with τi,j indicating the R(1, 1) measure between stock i and j,
i, j = 1, · · · , d,M .
From Proposition 4.1, the construction of the tests is analogous to the tests of tail index
equivalence.
We first construct a Minmax Tail Risk test. We use α¯ = 1
d
∑d
i=1 αˆi as an estimator
for the equivalent marginal tail index. Then, consider the following test statistic
T1 = α¯
max1≤i≤dXi,(n−k) −min1≤i≤dXi,(n−k)
X¯(n−k)
,
where X¯(n−k) = 1d
∑d
i=1Xi,(n−k). Under the null hypothesis, from the joint limit distri-
bution of the order statistics, we get that as n → ∞, √kT1 converges to a limit distri-
bution as maxdi=1Ni −mindi=1Ni. Here (N1, · · · , Nd)T is a random vector that follows a
d−dimensional normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ1, which is a
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submatrix of Σ consisting of the first d rows and d columns.
To test the hypothesis including the market return, we construct a Benchmark Tail
Risk test statistic as,
T2 = α
2
M
d∑
i=1
(
Xi,(n−k)
XM,(n−k)
− 1
)2
.
Similar to the discussion for the first test, under the null hypothesis, it follows that as
n → ∞, kT2 converges to a limit distribution as
d∑
i=1
(Ni − NM)2. The random vector
(N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T follows a (d + 1)−dimensional normal distribution with mean zero
and covariance matrix Σ.
The limit distribution of the two tests are exactly the same as those testing whether
the tail indices are equivalent. Thus, the simulation methods on the limit distributions
are also identified.
4.2 Results
We apply both the Minmax Tail Risk and the Benchmark Tail Risk tests to test
the tail risk equivalence hypothesis. The results of both tests are given in the last two
columns in Table 3. Under both testing procedures we reject the null hypothesis of joint
equivalence of both the tail index and the scale parameter, and therefore tail risk, at the
95% confidence level in the last four periods (2005-2008, . . . , 2008-2011). We therefore
conclude that the downside tail risks across stocks are heterogeneous in each period. By
showing that downside tail risk of stocks have significant cross-sectional variation, coupled
with the result of tail index equivalence in the last four periods, we provide evidence in
support of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the scale parameter. We are aware of the fact
that the evidence of tail scale heterogeneity is weak, because the conclusion is drawn from
combining observations from two interrelated tests.
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5 Determinants of Downside Tail Risk
5.1 Potential Determinants
In this section, we provide alternative evidence for the tail scale heterogeneity by in-
vestigating the cross-sectional determinants of the scale parameter from firm-level char-
acteristics. If heterogeneity in the scale is due to estimation error, then variation in the
scale parameter estimates should not be explained by difference in firm characteristics.
On the other hand, if cross-sectional variation in the scales can be explained by varia-
tion in the firm characteristics then the heterogeneity cannot be attributed to estimation
error.
We analyze the heterogeneity of downside tail risk in the four periods, 2005-2008,...,2008-
2011, by identifying cross-sectional determinants of the scale parameter from firm-level
characteristics. Since Moore et al. (2012) show that the scales should be priced in the
expected returns when the tail index hypothesis holds, we conjecture that the potential
determinants of the scale parameter should be similar to those of expected returns in
the prevailing literature. Because expected returns have to compensate for scale het-
erogeneity, the chosen firm-level characteristics are the known drivers of cross-sectional
variation in expected stock returns. These include size, book-to-market equity, leverage,
earnings-to-price, share turnover and the bid-ask spread in addition to the market beta
backed out from the CAPM model.
5.2 Data and Methodology
We collect annual firm-level accounting data for the same 230 non-financial firms used
in Subsection 3.1 from the COMPUSTAT data source for the years 2004,...,2007. The
sample periods are chosen to pre-date by one year the periods where we find evidence
of tail index equivalence6. For each year in the sample period, we calculate firm charac-
teristics for each firm. The size of a firm is calculated as the logarithm of its year-end
market capitalization. The book-to-market ratio is calculated by taking the logarithm
6By taking firm-level characteristics from the year preceding the sample period of the scale estimates,
we aim to analyze forward-looking drivers of tail risk.
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of the ratio of year-end book value of equity and the year-end market value of equity.
This identification is often related to the growth potential of a firm. A firm with a high
book-to-market ratio is a “growth stock”, whereas a firm with a low book-to-market eq-
uity ratio is a “value stock”. Firm leverage is calculated as long-term outstanding debt
divided by year-end value of book equity. The earnings-to-price ratio is calculated by the
earnings per share divided by the share’s year-end closing price. It is often referred to
as the “earnings yield”. A higher earnings-to-price ratio translates to a higher earnings
yield. The variable that proxies for share liquidity is calculated as the logarithm of the
ratio of total volume of common shares traded in the year and by the total number of
common shares outstanding. The proxy for investor asymmetric information is calcu-
lated as the difference in the highest annual closing price and the lowest annual closing
price of the stock divided by the average annual closing price of the stock. We refer to
this variable as the bid-ask spread. The higher the bid-ask spread the greater the level
of asymmetric information or uncertainty regarding the firm’s stock value. Finally, the
market beta is taken from the following estimate
βi =
Cov{Ri, Rm}
σ2m
where Ri and Rm are daily return series of the firm’s stock and the market portfolio
during the year and σm is the variance on the market return during the same year.
For each period consisting of 4 years, we match the estimated scale parameters with
the annual accounting data recorded at the end of the year preceding the beginning of
the period (e.g. the scale parameter estimated over the 2005-2008 period is matched
with accounting data for 2004). The selection of the 230 firms used in Section 3.1 was
conditioned ex-ante on having available firm characteristics with no missing observations
over the period of analysis. Furthermore, because the fiscal year end date of firms may
not always align with the calendar year end date, we only select firms with equivalent
fiscal and calendar year end dates.
To analyze the potential firm level determinants that drive the differences in the
scale parameter, we run 4 separate cross-sectional regressions. An estimate of the scale
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parameter directly follows from an estimate of the tail index as Â = k
n
X αˆn,n−k, where
k = k(n) is the same intermediate sequence used in the estimation of the tail index. Hall
(1982) shows that the scale parameter is consistent and asymptotically normal distributed
as,
√
k(log
n
k
)−1(
Aˆ
A
− 1) ∼ N (0, 1). (5.1)
Since we are under the assumption of tail index equivalence, we estimate the scale
parameter by using the sample mean tail index, α as
Aˆi =
k
n
Xαi,n,n−k.
In taking the mean tail index we focus specifically on the scale parameter. Notice that
equation (5.1) is equivalent to
√
k(log
n
k
)−1(log Aˆ− logA) ∼ N (0, 1).
Since the logarithm of the scale is normally distributed with a known variance, it is
convenient to use it directly in the regression against the firm characteristics as follows,
log Aˆi = β0 +
m∑
j=1
(βjΓ
j
i ) + i, i = 1, ..., d (5.2)
where Γji are the firm characteristics from the accounting data
7.
5.3 Results
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics for the year 2007
and Figure 2 illustrates a series of scatter plots of the scale parameter estimates from the
2008-2011 period against the firm level characteristics from 20078. Table 5 reports the
regression results. We find the size of the firm, measured by market capitalization, has a
7In the regression for each window, we further eliminate any firm with negative book-to-market ratio.
The negative book-to-market ratio of a firm presents problems in terms of lack of economic interpretation.
In the case of the book-to-market ratio, a negative value also presents problems by not permitting a log
transformation.
8Descriptive statistics and scatter plots for the remaining periods are available upon request.
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significantly negative relation to the scale parameter. Therefore firm downside tail risk is
significantly lower for large firms. Intuitively, smaller firms are less able to diversify risks
relative to their larger counterparts. This leaves them more susceptible to idiosyncratic
shocks and less able to withstand large aggregate shocks.
The book-to-market ratio has a significant positive relation to the scale parameter
over each of the 4 periods. It is significant at the 99% confidence level for the 2005-2008
period and then declines in significance over the remaining three periods (95% in 2006-
2009 and 90% in 2007-2010 and 2008-2011). This result implies that “growth” stocks have
higher downside tail risk than “value” stocks. Firms are able to deliver higher growth by
undertaking riskier projects with higher expected return. These firms would thus bear
greater downside tail risk potential than “value” firms that are involved in safer projects.
Higher leverage is found in the regressions to be positive and significant in relation
to the scale parameter in 3 of 4 periods. For the period encompassing 2006-2009 and
2007-2010 it is significant at the 99% confidence level and it is significant at the 95%
confidence level for the 2008-2011 period. Firms that fund their business activities with
greater amounts of debt are likely to have more volatile returns. One simple explanation
follows from the fact that leverage has an amplifying effect on the risk in equity return
compared to that in the return on average assets (RoAA) by
Ri = RoAA · (Leverage+ 1).
Given the level of downside risk in RoAA, firms that have higher leverage will have more
extreme downside losses.
Asymmetric information regarding investor perception of a firm’s stock, captured by
the bid-ask spread, is positively and significantly related to the scale parameter in each
of the four regression periods at the 99% confidence level. A greater bid-ask spread
corresponds to greater uncertainty regarding the future value of the firm. Firms with
higher uncertainty are more sensitive to new information regarding the firm’s future.
Adjustments to a firm’s value based on the arrival of new information will come in the
form of sharper price corrections. Hence, firms with higher bid-ask spreads have a greater
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chance of experiencing large negative (or positive) idiosyncratic shocks.
Lastly, the coefficient on the estimated market beta is positive and significant (at
the 99% confidence level) in only the 2008-2011 period. This can be explained by the
single-factor model. Suppose the return of a stock follows
Ri = βiRM + i,
where i is an idiosyncratic factor with scale Ai , AM is the scale parameters of the market
factor. Assume that the idiosyncratic and market factor share a common tail index α,
we get that the scale parameter of the stock return is
Ai = β
α
i AM + Ai ,
This equation shows a positive relation between the market beta and the scale parameter.
To conclude, the heterogeneity in the scale parameter is explained by the firm-level
characteristics. From the regression results, we find that book-to-market ratio, bid-ask
spread, and the market beta are positive and significantly related to the scale parameter,
while size and leverage are negative and significantly related to the scale. These results
provide alternative evidence for tail scale heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes cross-sectional differences in tail risk across equity returns and
further identifies drivers of these tail risks. If stock returns are assumed to follow a heavy-
tailed distribution, then the downside tail risk is determined by two parameters: the tail
index and scale. In the case of Gaussian distribution, this would only be one parameter
(variance). Moore et al. (2012) show that if large downside losses are of sufficient concern
to investors then the downside tail distribution of asset returns will share a homogeneous
tail index. This is referred to as the “tail index equivalence hypothesis”. We empirically
test this hypothesis by implementing two novel testing procedures, the Minmax Tail
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Shape and Benchmark Tail Shape tests, over a sample of 230 US non-financial firms. We
do not reject tail index equivalence between the years 2008 and 2011. During this period,
the heterogeneity in downside tail risk is attributed to the scale of the tail distribution.
The cross-sectional drivers of tail risk are the following firm-level characteristics: the size,
book-to-market ratio, leverage, bid-ask spread and market beta. Since expected returns
have to compensate for the variation in tail scale, the same factors are found to explain
the scale as in the case of expected returns.
Identification of the firm level drivers of downside tail risk help investors evaluate
potential tail risks when holding equities from different firms. Based on the evaluation
of firm-level characteristics, investors can construct a portfolio of equities which accom-
modates both their desired return and downside risk appetite. From a corporate finance
viewpoint, our result allows firm managers to better control their downside tail risk in
order to attract long-term risk averse investors.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
We begin by reviewing Proposition 7.2.3 in De Haan and Ferreira (2006). All the
other referenced theorems or examples used in this proof are also from this book. Under
the bivariate EVT setup, denote F1 and F2 as the marginal distribution of (X1, X2) and
Ui =
(
1
1−Fi
)←
as the marginal quantile function for i = 1, 2. Then, with proper conditions
on the k series, under a proper Skorokhod construction, there exists a Gaussian process
W (x, y) on [0, T ]× [0, T ] for any finite T , such that
sup
0≤x,y≤T
|
√
k
(
1
k
n∑
t=1
11−F1(X1,t)≤kx/n or 1−F2(X2,t)≤ky/n
− n
k
{
1− F
(
U1
( n
kx
)
, U2
(
n
ky
))}
−W (x, y)| → 0. units(7.1)
holds almost surely. Here, the process W (x, y) is a mean zero process with covariance
structure
Cov(W (x1, y1),W (x2, y2)) = x1∧x2 + y1∧ y2−R(x1, y1)−R(x2, y2) +R(x1∨x2, y1∨ y2).
By taking y = 0 in (7.1), we get that
sup
0≤x,y≤T
∣∣∣∣∣√k
(
1
k
n∑
t=1
11−F1(X1,t)≤kx/n − x
)
−W (x, 0)
∣∣∣∣∣→ 0.
almost surely. Comparing this expression with the proof of Theorem 5.1.2 and 5.1.4, we
observe that the process W (x, 0) is a standard Brownian motion that is used to construct
the limit process of the tail empirical process. Thus from Example 5.1.5, we get that
√
k
(
1
αˆ1
− 1
α1
)
P→ 1
α1
(∫ 1
0
W (u, 0)
du
u
−W (1, 0)
)
.
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This is equivalent to
√
k
(
αˆ1
α1
− 1
)
P→ −
(∫ 1
0
W (u, 0)
du
u
−W (1, 0)
)
=: N1.
Similarly, we get that
√
k
(
αˆ2
α2
− 1
)
P→ −
(∫ 1
0
W (0, v)
dv
v
−W (0, 1)
)
=: N2.
Since W is a bivariate Gaussian process, we get that (N1, N2) follows a bivariate normal
distribution, with mean zero, and marginal variance 1. The last step is to calculate their
covariance. The calculation is as follows
Cov(N1, N2) = Cov
(∫ 1
0
W (u, 0)
du
u
−W (1, 0),
∫ 1
0
W (0, v)
dv
v
−W (0, 1)
)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
R(u, v)
du
u
dv
v
−
∫ 1
0
R(1, v)
dv
v
−
∫ 1
0
R(u, 1)
du
u
+R(1, 1)
=
∫
0≤u≤v≤1
R(u, v)
du
u
dv
v
−
∫ 1
0
R(u, 1)
du
u
+
∫
0≤v≤u≤1
R(u, v)
du
u
dv
v
−
∫ 1
0
R(1, v)
dv
v
+R(1, 1)
=: I1 + I2 +R(1, 1).
Due to the homogeneity of the R function, we have that
∫
0≤u≤v≤1
R(u, v)
du
u
dv
v
=
∫ 1
0
dv
∫ v
0
R(u/v, 1)
du
u
=
∫ 1
0
dv
∫ 1
0
R(u, 1)
du
u
=
∫ 1
0
R(u, 1)
du
u
.
Hence I1 = 0. Symmetrically, we get that I2 = 0. Thus Cov(N1, N2) = R(1, 1).
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7.2 Simulation of the limit distribution
The test procedures, described in Subsection 3.1, require simulated observations from
the limit distribution of the test statistics. That is based on simulating a multivariate
normal distributed random vector (N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T with mean zero and covariance Σ
which consists of all bivariate τ measure between each pair of stocks. A conventional
procedure would be a two-step approach: first estimate the covariance matrix; second
employ a proper simulation technique to simulate a multivariate normal distribution with
the estimated covariance matrix. Instead of using such a two-step approach, we provide
a fast simulation procedure in one step without pre-estimating the covariances. This
procedure is feasible thanks to the structure of the covariance matrix to be estimated.
Recall that the estimator for τi,j for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , d,M is given as
τˆi,j =
1
k
n∑
t=1
1
Xi,t>Xi,(n−k) and Xj,t>Xj,(n−k)
=
1
k
(
1Xi,1>Xi,(n−k) , · · · , 1Xi,n>Xi,(n−k)
)(
1Xj,1>Xj,(n−k) , · · · , 1Xj,n>Xj,(n−k)
)T
.
Notice that this expression is also valid in the case that i = j, as in this case τˆi,i = 1 = τi,i.
By writing each element in the estimator of Σ as the expression above, we get that
Σˆ =
1
k
ITn×(d+1)In×(d+1),
where In×(d+1) = (It,i)t=1,··· ,n;i=1,··· ,d,M with It,i = 1Xi,t>Xi,(n−k) is an indicator matrix indi-
cating whether the i-th stock on day t is having a loss exceeding a threshold corresponding
to the i-th shock, indicated by Xi,(n−k).
With expressing the estimator of the covariance matrix Σˆ as a matrix product, we
have the following simulation procedure for the random vector (N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T . First,
simulate n independently and identically standard normally distributed random variables
(G1, · · · , Gn)T . Subsequently, calculate
(N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T = 1√
k
(G1, · · · , Gn) · In×(d+1).
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It is obvious that the simulated (d+1)−dimensional random vector follows a multivariate
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σˆ. By repeating the above
procedure, we obtain a simulated sample of the random vector (N1, · · · , Nd, NM)T with
the desired distribution. After this, it is straightforward to obtain simulated random
variables following the limit distributions of the test statistics.
29
8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Test Results on Tail Index Equivalence Hypothesis
λ 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Sample 1
α = 3
Minmax 3.6 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.9 4.5 3.6 3.8 4.5 3.0 4.7
Benchmark 5.3 6.1 6.0 5.2 6.0 5.4 4.2 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.0
α = 4
Minmax 2.7 2.7 1.0 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.5 2.5
Benchmark 5.0 6.2 5.0 6.0 5.6 4.2 3.6 3.7 2.6 2.1 0.8
Sample 2
α1 = 3, α2 = 4
Minmax 14.4 14.6 14.3 13.3 14.5 15.5 13.7 12.6 10.1 7.1 5.0
Benchmark 16.0 18.4 18.2 15.9 12.4 10.1 9.3 6.8 3.1 1.1 1.3
α1 = 4, α2 = 3
Minmax 13.7 17.0 14.6 14.8 15.1 13.9 12.6 9.1 6.8 3.3 1.5
Benchmark 4.3 4.0 3.3 2.8 3.8 1.7 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.5
α1 = 3, α2 = 5
Minmax 42.0 40.2 43.1 41.5 44.4 42.7 46.2 38.1 35.1 26.0 16.2
Benchmark 33.7 35.6 31.4 32.5 27.1 24.3 19.9 14.3 10.8 6.9 3.6
α1 = 5, α2 = 3
Minmax 40.2 39.9 41.5 39.0 34.5 35.1 26.6 17.3 9.9 6.2 3.3
Benchmark 5.0 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 4.3 4.2 2.2 2.1 1.7 0.6
Note: This table reports the percentage of simulations in which the p-value falls below the 5% level,
under the null hypothesis of tail index equivalence. The data are generated as in Sample 1 and Sample
2 in Subsection 2.2. For each given λ and sample setup, we simulate 1000 samples with each sample
consisting of 1000 observations. The parameter λ indicates the tail dependence between the simulated
observations. λ = 0 corresponds to tail independence, while the increase of λ corresponds to an increase
in tail dependence.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Tail Index and Test on Equivalence
MIN MEAN MAX STD αˆm τˆ τˆm φˆm φˆb
00-03 1.39 2.75 4.56 0.45 3.82 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.00
01-04 1.55 2.74 4.24 0.44 3.60 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.00
02-05 1.63 2.75 4.14 0.44 3.68 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00
03-06 1.38 2.84 4.92 0.51 3.36 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.00
04-07 1.28 2.83 4.01 0.47 3.11 0.11 0.20 0.01 0.15
05-08 1.36 2.27 3.60 0.41 1.90 0.26 0.40 0.04 0.41
06-09 1.38 2.49 4.29 0.41 2.29 0.26 0.42 0.37 0.65
07-10 1.56 2.57 3.84 0.41 2.51 0.26 0.41 0.10 0.54
08-11 1.79 2.66 4.26 0.40 2.52 0.27 0.43 0.42 0.57
Note: This table reports a summary of statistics of the tail indexes of stock returns for each rolling
window. The dataset consists of 230 US equities and the benchmark S&P 500 Composite Index, with
daily returns from 01.01 2000 to 31.12.2011. αˆM is the tail index estimate for S&P 500 Index. τˆ is the
average value of tail dependence estimates across all pairs of equities, whereas τˆM is the average value
of tail dependence estimates between equities and S&P 500 Index. The φˆm and φˆb columns report the
p-values based on the test statistics in Subsection 2.1 for testing the tail index equivalence. The m and
b indicate the Minmax Tail Shape and Benchmark Tail Shape tests respectively.
31
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Scale Parameter and Test on Equivalence
MIN MEAN MAX STD Aˆm φˆm φˆb
00-03 0.20 8.37 322.59 23.93 1.17 0.00 0.00
01-04 0.17 5.79 119.70 13.42 0.71 0.00 0.00
02-05 0.19 3.64 62.38 7.15 0.49 0.00 0.00
03-06 0.13 2.70 55.65 5.42 0.10 0.00 0.00
04-07 0.09 2.45 47.74 4.44 0.10 0.00 0.00
05-08 0.15 2.09 34.21 3.23 0.18 0.00 0.00
06-09 0.19 4.45 47.87 6.58 0.42 0.00 0.00
07-10 0.23 5.62 77.18 8.98 0.61 0.00 0.00
08-11 0.23 8.25 256.02 21.18 0.70 0.00 0.00
Note: This table presents a summary statistics of the scale parameter for each rolling window. The
dataset consists of 230 US equities and the benchmark S&P 500 Composite Index, with daily returns
from 01.01 2000 to 31.12.2011. AˆM is the scale parameter estimate for S&P 500 Index. The φˆm and
φˆb columns report the p-values based on the test statistics in Subsection 4.1 for testing the tail risk
equivalence. The m and b indicate the Minmax Tail Risk and Benchmark Tail Risk tests respectively.
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Figure 1: p - values: Four-year rolling window analysis
Note: The figure plots the p-values for both Minmax and Benchmark tests for each rolling window.
The dataset consists of 230 US equities and the benchmark S&P 500 Composite Index with daily returns
from 01.01 2000 to 31.12.2011. We move the four-year rolling window monthly.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Firm Characteristics, 2007
Variable MEAN STD MIN MAX
Market Cap (log) 7.192 1.863 2.766 13.131
Book-to-Market Equity (log) -0.932 0.825 -6.354 0.888
Leverage 0.177 0.163 0 0.718
Earnings-to-Price 0.038 0.082 -0.698 0.147
Share Turnover (log) 7.54 0.702 5.213 9.111
Bid-Ask Spread 0.533 0.24 0.116 1.925
Market Beta 0.958 0.395 -0.296 2.283
Note: The table reports the summary statistics of the firm characteristics: Market Capitalization (log),
Book-to-Market Equity (log), Leverage, Bid-Ask Spread, Market Beta, Share Turnover (log), Earnings-
to-Price Ratio in the end of 2007.
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots: Scale (2009-2011) vs. Firm Characteristics (2007)
Note: The figure presents the scatter plots of the scale (log), estimated from the daily returns in the
period 2008-2011, against the firm characteristics calculated from 2007 year end data: Market Capi-
talization (log), Book-to-Market Equity (log), Leverage, Bid-Ask Spread, Market Beta, Share Turnover
(log), Earnings-to-Price Ratio.
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Table 5: The Determinants of Downside Tail Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Size -0.131∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(-5.68) (-5.27) (-6.18) (-6.13)
BE/ME 0.136∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.102∗
(3.03) (2.45) (1.88) (1.76)
Leverage 0.314 1.057∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗
(1.21) (3.22) (4.58) (2.38)
E/P 0.498 0.435 0.230 -1.328∗
(0.94) (0.75) (0.23) (-1.71)
Turnover 0.0105 0.105 0.178∗∗ 0.0648
(0.22) (1.56) (2.48) (1.01)
BidAsk 1.108∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗
(6.80) (4.87) (3.38) (4.26)
Beta 0.0245 0.0566 0.0730 0.510∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.55) (0.85) (3.52)
Constant 0.563 0.712 0.650 1.134∗∗
(1.56) (1.57) (1.31) (2.40)
Observations 217 219 222 225
R2 0.444 0.348 0.372 0.455
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The above table lists the results of four regressions over four sample periods. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the scale parameter is estimated over a four year window, e.g. 2005-2008,
2006-2009, 2007-2010, and 2008-2011. The dependent variables are taken as year-end data for the years
preceding the estimation of the dependent variable, e.g. 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. These are measured
as follows: Size is the logarithm value of market capitalization (ME), BE/ME is the logarithm value of
the book-to-market equity, Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio, and E/P is the earnings-to-price ratio.
Turnover is the share turnover and BidAsk is the bid-ask difference. Beta is the market beta estimated
from CAPM model.
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